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In this paper, we construct a dynamic model of a kleptocratic dictatorship to explain 
sub-Saharan Africa’s dismal economic performance between the early 1970s and the 
mid-1990s. The dictator’s objective is to maximize a discounted stream of revenue 
generated through theft of the economy’s output by choosing the optimal expropriation 
rate and the size of the security force employed to enforce his rule. The model is used to 
evaluate alternative intervention options open to developed countries such as 
unconditional, conditional and selective foreign aid, financial and military assistance to 
rebel groups, as well as medical relief to combat the HIV/AIDs pandemic. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last four decades, Africa’s economic performance has substantially lagged that in 
other regions of the world. In the 1980s, GDP per capita declined by 1.3 percent per annum 
on average in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1990 and 1994, this worsened to –1.8 percent 
per annum, more than 6 percentage points below the average for all low-income developing 
countries. These figures are all the more disappointing as development economists had 
forecasted favourable growth prospects when many African states secured their 
independence from their European colonial masters in the 1960s. Despite disadvantages due 
to their “colonial inheritance”, these African economies were expected to grow more 
quickly than their Asian counterparts. Indeed, from the mid-1960s to 1973, many African 
countries did achieve respectable growth rates. For example, Nigeria and Indonesia had 
comparable income levels in the early 1970s. But coinciding with the political centralization 
of African states and the abandonment of multi-party democracy for authoritarian one-party   3
rule, economic performance on the continent deteriorated rapidly and did not recover until 
the second half of the 1990s.
1 The United Nations Development Programme calls the 1980s 
the “lost decade” for many of these states. 
Over the years, many empirical studies have been undertaken to establish the root 
causes of Africa’s growth tragedy (see Collier and Gunning (1999) for a survey).
2 
Development economists have classified the explanatory factors for Africa’s dismal growth 
experience along two axes: domestic versus external and destiny versus policy. Domestic-
destiny factors include poor soil quality, tropical conditions favourable to diseases such as 
malaria, low population density resulting in high internal transport costs, and the small size 
of countries (leading to small markets and higher risks). External-destiny factors include 
high transport costs to export markets due to the preponderance of land-locked countries 
and the lack of access to navigable rivers, as well as the lack of diversification in colonial 
economies that make the countries vulnerable to terms of trade shocks. Domestic-policy 
factors include autocratic regimes that encourage large public sectors (which form their 
support bases), poor infrastructure (transport, telecommunication networks and courts), 
inefficient education and health services, an urban bias and the heavy taxation of agriculture 
through marketing monopolies, as well as financial repression with directed bank lending to 
governments and public enterprises. Finally, external-policy factors include misaligned 
exchange rates, high taxes on exported crops, quotas on imports that create favourable 
conditions for corruption, and accumulated foreign debts resulting from the need to finance 
public sector expansion. 
While there is little doubt that destiny factors have contributed to Africa’s slow 
growth, it is clearly more useful for economists to focus on the “wrong” policies adopted by 
African leaders in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. A striking feature of the post-colonial 
African political landscape is the prevalence of single-party rule and the large number of 
dictatorships in particular.
3 The literature on African politics provides many clues as to why 
such poor policies were consciously chosen by these rational political elites (see, for 
example, Thomson (2000)). In the next section, we will present a brief overview of Africa’s 
political economy. Our dynamic model of a kleptocratic dictatorship is presented in Section 
                                                 
1 By the mid-1990s, many sub-Saharan African dictatorships had collapsed due either to the sickness or death 
of the dictators (the “strong men” of Africa who had led the anti-colonial movements prior to independence), 
or because of the precipitous economic decline brought about by their policies. There was a sudden, quite 
remarkable revival of multi-party democracy in many states in the 1990s. 
2 See Sender (1999) for a rare dissenting view on Africa’s post-colonial development. 
3 In 1988, 29 sub-Saharan African countries had one-party political systems, 10 were ruled by military 
oligarchies, only 9 had multi-party constitutions, 2 were monarchies and 2 were racial oligarchies.   4
3. Section 4 discusses the model’s steady state solutions and explains how macroeconomic 
performance and social welfare are related to the characteristics and preferences of the 
dictator. In Section 5, we use the model to evaluate the desirability of alternative aid 
strategies that may be adopted by developed countries, and in the process shed light on the 
‘selectivity’ versus ‘conditionality’ debate. Section 6 considers the impact of the dictator’s 
planning horizon (that is, the expected longevity of his rule) when the growth rate of the 
economy depends endogenously on his behavior. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the 
paper. 
 
2.  Post-Colonial Africa’s Political Economy 
 
2.1 The Rise of Dictatorships 
 
Perhaps the most important of the many legacies left behind by colonial rule was the 
arbitrary nature of state boundaries as the continent was formally carved up by the major 
European powers following the 1884-5 Berlin conference. For example, within the borders 
of Tanzania co-existed about 200 ethnic groups. Not surprisingly then, national unity lay at 
the heart of post-colonial African nationalism. The objective was the transformation of 
multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-racial societies into unitary nations. The primacy of 
national unity quickly resulted in political activity being channelled through just one state-
sanctioned party and the abandonment of the liberal democratic constitutions and multi-
party elections that were hastily conjured by the departing colonial rulers. These fragile 
pluralist institutions distinctly lacking in historical moorings were soon abandoned, with a 
reversion to the hierarchical, centralised and autocratic model of government found earlier 
under imperial rule. 
The political norm in most African states from the 1970s to the early 1990s was a 
highly personalised executive governing through tightly-controlled one-party structures, 
where the leader (although bound by traditions or customs) were free from legal-rational 
constraints. Personal rule in Africa (“patrimonialism”) was authoritarian, arbitrary, 
ostentatious and inefficient. Without free elections or political competition, rent-extracting 
dictators governing kleptocratic (“vampire”, “pirate” or predatory) states could only be 
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2.2 Foreign Aid and Africa 
 
As most of sub-Saharan Africa slid into ever-steeper economic decline in the 1970s 
and 1980s, many concerned developed countries poured enormous sums of money into the 
affected countries through foreign direct aid and government-to-government loans or 
indirectly through loans via multilateral institutions and international developmental 
agencies such as the IMF, World Bank and United Nations. The objective of foreign aid has 
ranged from the prevention of social catastrophe to assisting countries achieve self-
sustaining economic growth. However, these poorly conditioned aid and loans proved 
completely ineffective in lifting economic growth. Easterly (2002) reports that he can only 
find one successful case out of 138 where aid had a positive and significant impact on 
growth in the recipient country. Similarly, in a study of non-military aid flows to 96 
countries, Boone (1996) finds that aid does not significantly increase investment and 
growth, nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development 
indicators. Boone finds that virtually all foreign aid is consumed rather than invested 
because much of it is stolen by elites in the recipient countries. In fact, it has been argued 
that foreign aid almost certainly helped create and aggravate problems in Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Sudan and Zaire by subsidizing and propping up dictators whose rules proved especially 
disastrous.
4 More recent papers by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and others find that aid may 
be helpful, but only when selectively extended to countries with good fiscal, monetary and 
trade policies. 
From our brief overview of post-colonial African politics, it is obvious that Africa’s 
economic performance would be poorly explained by the standard neoclassical growth 
model or even endogenous (“new”) growth models. The artificial construct of a social 
planner maximizing the collective welfare of economic agents is fairly useless in explaining 
the workings of a kleptocratic state. Instead, we aim to build a macroeconomic model of a 
typical African economy where a dictatorial ruler only looks after his own selfish interests 
and engages in diversion rather than production. The primary objective of such a ruler is to 
maximize the revenues generated from his expropriation of output produced by citizens net 
                                                 
4 For example, it is estimated that Mobutu Sese Seko, whose dictatorial regime in Zaire lasted 32 years, stole 
US$4 billion from foreign aid, amounting to almost half of all the foreign aid received by Zaire between 1970 
and 1994.   6
of the costs incurred in maintaining a security force to enforce his coercive rule and 
successfully suppress any potential uprising.
5 
 
2.3 Related Literature 
 
While other researchers have adopted the rational choice approach in explaining the 
workings and policy choices of various political regimes, there is very little research that 
links the actions of a rational, optimizing political regime to the economic performance and 
growth dynamics of a country under its rule. For example, Wintrobe (1990) develops a 
static model where the dictator cares about both consumption and power. Dictatorial 
regimes are classified as ‘tinpots’ or ‘totalitarian’ based on the relative importance of the 
two objectives. However, in this model, economic performance is exogenous. The author 
finds that an exogenous improvement in economic conditions induces a tinpot dictator to 
reduce repression but a totalitarian dictator to increase repression. Chen and Fang (1999) 
examine the actions of a dictatorship that is characterized by differences between its 
preference for redistribution and that of the ‘median citizen’. The dictator, however, does 
not solve an explicit optimization problem. The model predicts that democracies will 
prevail at high levels of economic development while countries with low levels of economic 
development will be trapped in equilibria with long-lasting dictatorships. The level of 
economic development is, however, exogenous to the model. 
The working paper of Overland, Simon and Spagat (2000) most closely resembles 
our proposed model in the sense that the economic performance of a dictatorship is 
modelled endogenously. In this model, the probability of a successful revolt (that is, the 
survival function for the dictator) is somewhat arbitrarily specified to depend on the 
aggregate capital stock. The dictator’s rate of expropriation is also exogenous. The authors 
adopt the Bellman equation approach to solve the dynamic optimization problem. However, 
because a successful revolt is a possible actual outcome, the complexity of the model 
renders analytical solutions impossible. The authors run simulations based on over 400 
alternative sets of parameters values and discuss what outcomes occur with the highest 
frequencies. They obtain a ‘bifurcation’ result: below certain aggregate capital levels, 
dictatorships tend to collapse, while above these levels, dictatorships prevail but grow at 
                                                 
5 This paper is part of a larger research project that will also examine models where competition between rival 
ethnic groups and external conflicts between neighboring states impact economic performance and growth. 
The project is driven by the observation that, for most former African colonies, the period since independence 
has been characterized by destructive power struggles, as well as by the use of government machinery to 
channel money to favored ethnic groups.   7
rates in excess of the social optimum. It is then argued that this phenomenon is observed in 
East Asia and Africa. However, the analytical intractability of the model precludes the 
authors from performing any useful policy analysis with it. 
In our model, the dictator optimally chooses the expropriation rate as well as the size 
of his security force, which determines the probability that a citizen revolt will succeed. 
Households optimally choose their consumption path taking the dictator’s choices as given. 
The dictator in turn takes into account the impact of his choices on the households’ 
decisions such that both optimization problems are solved simultaneously. In equilibrium, 
no revolt actually occurs as the dictator offers just sufficient incentive for cost-benefit 
analysing households to prefer not revolting to revolting. The model is explained in more 
detail in the next section; here it suffices to say that our careful construction of the “no 
revolt condition” renders the model sufficiently tractable that we can perform useful and 
practical policy experiments with it. 
In summary, the principal innovations of our paper are: (1) the endogenous modelling of 
economic performance in the context of a model of dictatorship; (2) the incorporation of 
complete micro-foundations with careful simultaneous modelling of the dictator’s and the 
representative citizen’s dynamic optimization problems; and (3) the use of the model for 
extensive and in-depth policy analyses with significant real world implications. 
 
3.  The Model 
 
3.1  Overview 
 
The model comprises three types of agents: citizens, a dictator, and members of his security 
force. The dictator’s objective is to maximize a discounted stream of revenue derived from 
expropriating part of the output ypt that is produced by citizens according to  pt pt yA k
α = , 
where  01 α << , A is the constant level of technology, and kpt is capital per worker. The 
fraction of output that he expropriates at time t is denoted  t e . In order to enforce his 
coercive rule, the dictator deploys a proportion,  st u , of the labour force as his personal 
security force.
6 The remaining fraction,  1 ts t uu = − , supplies labour for the production of 
output. 
                                                 
6 The dictator’s personal security force should be distinguished from a military force employed to contain 
external threats. We do not model such a military force here.   8
      When choosing  t e  and  st u , the dictator takes into account the impact of his choices on 
the citizens’ decision-making. A person deployed in the security force is paid the same 
wage as one working in the production sector. However, unlike an ordinary citizen, a 
member of the security force does not face expropriation by the dictator. For simplicity, we 
assume that members of the security force always consume all of their income. Moreover, 
the security force itself never revolts against the dictator.
7 
Taking the dictator’s choices as given, citizens solve a Ramsey-type optimization 
problem to determine their optimal paths for consumption and capital accumulation. At 
each point in time, citizens may decide to revolt against the dictator and establish an 
alternative political regime. A revolt succeeds or fails with probabilities  t λ  and 1 t λ −  
respectively. These probabilities in turn depend on the size of the dictator’s security force. 
Citizens compare their welfare from not revolting to the expected welfare from a revolt; 
they are risk averse and will only revolt when the welfare from doing so exceeds that from 
remaining acquiescent. Their decision rule leads to the no-revolt condition, which we 
abbreviate and refer to henceforth as the “NRC”. 
 
3.2  The No-Revolt Condition (NRC) 
 
The gross income earned from production by a representative civilian under the dictator’s 
rule is equal to  pt y . Then her income after expropriation by the dictator is () 1 tp t ey − . 
Alternativelly she may choose to revolt, whereupon she receives ( ) 1
s
tp t gy ψ −−  in the event 
of a successful revolt or () 1
u
tt p t gep y −−−  when the revolt fails, where 
s
pt y  and 
u
pt y  are the 
per-citizen output levels when the revolt is successful and unsuccessful respectively,  t g  is 
the cost of engaging in a revolt (say the damage inflicted on the productive infrastructure 
during a revolt that permanently reduces production possibilities), ψ  is the time-invariant 
expropriation rate the successor political regime is expected to impose when the revolt is 
successful (with  t e ψ < ), and p is the penalty the dictator imposes over and above  t e  should 
the attempted revolt fail. We discuss how this penalty is determined in Section 4.1.2. 
  To render the model more realistic, we model the permanent cost of a revolt (that is, 
the proportion of output that is “lost” at each point in time after the revolt),  t g , as follows: 
                                                 
7 While military coups were commonplace in post-colonial Africa, revolts by internal security or police forces 
were almost non-existent. Military coups were usually led by middle-ranking or junior officers with different 
and complex motives. We believe that it is very difficult and ultimately unproductive to attempt to model the 
relationship between a dictator and heterogenous lower-ranking military officers.   9
   ts t gu g =⋅ ,          ( 1 )  
where g is the exogenous component of  t g . In this specification, the cost of a revolt is 
higher the larger the size of the dictator’s security force.
8 
Suppose the representative citizen’s instantaneous utility function takes the CRRA 
form: 











,        ( 2 )  
where φ measures the degree of risk aversion and x is the payoff under the alternative 
scenarios of no revolt, a successful revolt, and an unsuccessful revolt. 
The dictator announces  t e  and  st u  at each point of time. Citizens then compare their 
lifetime utility from not revolting to the expected lifetime utility from revolting at the 
announced levels of  t e ,  st u  and p. They revolt only when the the latter is at least as high as 
the former. That is, 
() []
00
|| revolt No revolt E Ud t U d t
∞∞
− > ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∫∫ .          
On the other hand, the dictator, who we assume always wishes to retain power, will choose 
t e  and  st u  such that   
   () ()
00
|| revolt No revolt E Ud t E U d t
∞∞
− ≤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∫∫ . 
The dictator does so by maximizing his objective function (gross revenues from 
expropriation minus wage payments to the security force) subject to the NRC.
9 Notice that 
this also implies that expected utility from the two alternatives may not match at every point 
in time. We can therefore write the instantaneous NRC as: 
   () () || No revolt revolt t EU EU − −= Φ       ( 3 )  
This expression holds when the expected lifetime utility from revolt equals the lifetime 
utility from not revolting, in which case  t Φ  should be normally distributed with a zero 
mean. Obviously, at some points in time,  t Φ  will be positive while at others it will be 
                                                 
8 The idea is that a larger security force can cause greater damage to an economy’s infrastructure in their 
attempt to suppress an uprising. 
9 The deterministic nature of the model and the NRC means that there is a zero probability that the “state of 
the world” changes from ‘no revolt’ to ‘revolt’. That there have actually been relatively few citizen revolts in 
post-colonial Africa (and even fewer successful ones) supports our modelling approach.    10
negative. However, in the long run, intertemporally, the deviations must cancel one another 
out. As  () |
n
No revolt t EU U − =  and  () ( ) |1
s u
revolt t t EU U U λλ =+ − , the instantaneous NRC is 
   () 1
ns u
tt t t UU U λλ −− − = Φ  
where 
     ( ) 1
n
tp t UU e y ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦ , 
   ( ) 1
ss
tt p t UU g y ψ ⎡⎤ =− − ⎣⎦ , 
and 
   ( ) 1
uu
tt t p t UU g e p y ⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦ .       ( 4 )  
Using our functional form for the utility function, (2), the instantaneous NRC may be 
written as 
         () ( ) () ( ) ()
11 1
11 1 1 1
su




⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ − − −− −− −−− =−Φ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦. (5) 
Note that  ,
s
pt pt yy and 
u
pt y  are determined by the citizens’ optimization, which we now 
explain.  
 
3.3  Citizens’ Optimization Problem 
 
As in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans (RCK) model, the citizens in our model optimally 
allocate their income at each point in time between consumption and saving to maximize 
lifetime utility, subject to their intertemporal budget constraint. However, unlike the RCK 
model, this constraint incorporates the dictator’s announced expropriation rate, t e , the 
proportion of labour force deployed in the security force,  st u , and the size of the penalty 
that is imposed when a revolt fails, p. We assume that individuals are infinitely lived and 
have infinite planning horizons.  
Given that the dictator ensures at every point in time that the NRC is satisfied so that 
an individual citizen always decides not to revolt, her optimal time path of consumption is a 
solution to the following dynamic optimization problem: 
()
0
max   
pt
t
pt c eUc d t
β
∞
∫     subject to 
(i)  () 1 pt t pt pt ke y c =− −  , where  pt pt yA k
α = , and 
(ii) a given  t e ,  st u  and p,   11
where the utility function is that given in equation (2) and β is the rate of time preference. 
Note that kpt may represent a broad definition of capital that includes physical as well as 
human capital. For simplicity, we assume that the depreciation rate of capital is zero. 
The Euler equation derived from the first order conditions of the optimization 
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
. (6) 
Even though no revolt actually occurs in equilibrium, to compute the NRC we need to 
derive the hypothetical incomes and productive output that would be generated should a 
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.      ( 6 ” )  
These equations, together with their respective capital accumulation constraints, give rise to 
the following expressions for steady state output per citizen when there is no revolt, when 
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Note that in the benchmark RCK model,  ()
/(1 ) * / pt yA A
α α αβ
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3.4  The Security Force 
 
As noted previously, each member of the security force receives a wage equal to that earned 
by a civilian citizen in the production sector. This wage is given by 
( ) 1 stp t wy α =− .         ( 9 )  
For simplicity, we assume that security force members always consume their entire 
income. The consumption of a representative agent in the security force is therefore 
   ( ) 1 stp t cy α =− .         ( 1 0 )  
Although the labour market clearing condition implies that wages for  civilians and security 
force members are equal, the latter is a priviledged group in that their incomes are exempt 
from expropriation. This is an example of a patron-client relationship where the patron 
offers material benefits to a group in exchange for loyalty. As stated previously, we asssume 
that members of the security force never rebel aginst their patron, the dictator. 
 
3.5  The Dictator’s Optimization Problem 
 
In seeking to maximize his lifetime income, the dictator faces a trade-off in his choice 
variables, the expropriation-output ratio,  t e , and the size of his security force as a 
proportion of the total labour force,  st u . Citizens are more likely to revolt the higher the 
expropriation rate. A larger security force will be more successful in suppressing a citizens’ 
revolt but results in less labour being available for use in production and therefore less 
output to expropriate, holding the expropriation rate constant. In equilibrium, the dictator 
chooses a combination of the expropriation rate and the size of the security force such that 
citizen’s marginally prefer not revolting to revolting, as summarized in the NRC. 
  The dictator is assumed to have access to foreign bank accounts and other foreign 
investment opportunities, so that his revenues from expropriation do not constitute part of 
the domestic capital stock. Consequently, only the savings of civilians are transformed into 
the economy’s capital stock by a latent financial sector (which is not modelled). 
  In addition, we abstract from the dictator’s role as a provider of public goods and 
services. We can think of the dictator financing a fixed amount of expenditures (on 
highways, water systems, fire services, schools etc) by levying a non-distortionary lump-
sum tax on each citizen.
10 
                                                 
10 Of course, in a more complicated model, the quantity of public goods and services provided by the dictator 
may impact the citizens’ decision to revolt, as will the choice of taxes.   13
  The dictator’s problem is therefore to choose ( ) ,( 0 , 1 ) ts t eu ∈  at each point in time to 
maximize a stream of expropriated output net of the costs of deploying his security force, 
subject to the NRC: 







tt p t s t t s t s t t eu De D d te e y u L w u L d t
ββ
∞∞
−− ⎡ ⎤ == − − ⎣ ⎦ ∫∫   
such that 
  () ( ) () ( ) ()
11 1
11 1 1 1
su




⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ −− − −− − − − −= − Φ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦, 
where βD is the dictator’s rate of time preference and Lt is the size of the labor force. 
  Finally, we need to specify how the probability of success of a potential revolt, λt, 
depends (negatively) on the size of the dictator’s security force, ust. For simplicity, we 
assume a linear function of the form 
   1 ts t u λ =− .          ( 1 1 )  
 
4.  Solutions, Comparative Statics and Dynamics 
 
4.1  Solving the Model 
 
4.1.1  Simplifying Assumptions 
 
The model, as presented above, turns out to be highly complex. For example, the general 
form of the NRC allows our dictator to choose complicated paths for  st u  and  t e  where their 
values at each point in time depends on the instantaneous values of ypt on the transition to 
the steady state. To simplify the model, we need to restrict  st u  and  t e  to be constant on the 
transitional path as well as in the steady state. That is,  st u  and  t e  always jump 
instantaneously to their new steady state values in response to a shock. The dictator’s 
optimal choices then depend solely on the steady state values of the variables in the 
civilians’ optimization problem, such as 
*
pt y .
11 We can justify this simplification in several 
ways. For example, the full optimization problem may impose an information overload for a 
dictator in the real world (as it does for the economic modeler!), so that the heuristic 
                                                 
11 While the simplifications to the dictator’s optimization problem render the dynamics of the model less 
interesting and although our focus is on the steady state behavior of the model, we argue that it is nevertheless 
important that the model be cast in a dynamic framework. This allows the reader to discern clearly the choices 
facing an omniscient dictator unconstrained by computational complexity issues and those facing a more 
“realistic” boundedly-rational one. That is, we believe it is better to start with the complete model and impose 
restrictions on it on the grounds of computability, than to start with a simple static model and leave the reader 
wondering about the form of the fully specified model.     14
shortcut taken here is a realistic “second-best” solution that he rationally adopts. Secondly, 
the dictator may choose to adjust  st u  and  t e  fully at the instant of a shock’s arrival if 
gradual adjustment of  st u  is costly. For example, it is expensive and inefficient to train new 
soldiers or security force members one by one or in dribs and drabs. That is why we often 
observe armies and police forces training their new recruits in large batches and intakes. In 
essence, we are implicitly imposing adjustment costs that are the reverse of those in the q-
theory of investment, where instantaneous adjustments to the capital stock are costly. Here, 
it is gradual adjustment that is costly. In any case, Appendix B shows that allowing  t e  to 
vary in the transition path to the steady state will not alter the qualitative nature of the 
model. 
With our simplifications, the instantaneous NRC `and the intertemporal NRC are 
identical, so 
   () 1
ns u
tt t t UU U λλ −− − = Φ        ( 1 2 )  
at every point in time. We further simplify matters by assuming that the dictator does just 
enough at every point in time to prevent a revolt, that is  0  t t Φ =Φ= ∀ . We can therefore 
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A








−− − ⎛⎞ ⎡ ⎤
− −− − − − − − − = ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥
⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
, (13)  
where 1 ts t u λ =− . Note that we have substituted equation (7) into (5) after imposing our 
simplifying assumptions. Finally, by imposing φ α = , the above expression reduces to 











.        ( 1 4 )  
 
4.1.2  Determination of the Optimal Credible Penalty 
 
Let χ represent the intrinsic (time-invariant) character, personality and psychological make-
up of the dictator. A dictator with a larger value of χ is one who strikes greater terror and 
fear into the hearts of his citizens. Setting aside the NRC for a moment, suppose the citizens 
have actually decided to mount a revolt, which unfortunately fails. Following this 
unsuccessful revolt, the probability of a subsequent revolt succeeding is reduced to an 
extent that is related to χ: 
   ( ) /1
post
tt λ λχ = + ,         ( 1 5 )    15
where 
post
t λ  is the probability of a successful revolt following an unsuccessful one. The 
probability of success falls after a failed revolt for several plausible reasons. An important 
one is that the citizens may be demoralized and psychologically defeated; hence the 
negative relationship between χ and 
post
t λ . Suppose also that, after the initial revolt, the 
dictator does not levy an additional penalty on the next unsuccessful revolt.
12 Then the 
“post-revolt” NRC is given by 







=− − ,         ( 1 6 )  
where 
post
t e  is the optimal expropriation rate after the unsuccessful revolt. Since the pre-
revolt optimal expropriation rate is given by  ( )/ ( ) tt ep g p g λ ψ = +− + − , we can compute 
the optimal, credible penalty as the difference between the pre-revolt and post-revolt 
optimal expropriation rates. That is, 
  
post
tt p eeg χ =− = .         ( 1 7 )  
Intuitively, the psychological effect of a failed revolt enables the dictator to expropriate a 
greater proportion of output for a given size of his security force. It is this additional 
expropriation that makes the initial pre-revolt penalty level, p, credible in the first place. 
That is, citizens know that it is ex-post optimal for the dictator to levy the penalty over and 
above the original expropriation rate because the threat of a further revolt is diminished for 
any given size of the security force. 
 
4.1.3  Solving the Dictator’s Problem 
 
Using (14), the dictator’s optimization problem reduces to 







tp t s t t p t s tt eu Dee y u L y u L d t
β α
∞
⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦ ∫  , 
subject to 
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Suppose the labour force is of constant size  1 t L ≡  and that  0 ψ = . Then the Lagrangian is 
() ( ) ( )( ) ( )
* 11 ( 1 ) 11 ts t s t p t t s t eu u y e gu g αµχ χ ℑ= − − − − + + − − + ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , (19) 
                                                 
12 Without this assumption, the problem of determining the penalty becomes a recursive one, resulting in a 
highly complicated expression for the optimal value of p.   16
where, from (7),  () ( )
/(1 ) /(1 ) * /1
a
pt t yA A e
α αα αβ
−− =−  and µ  is the Lagrange multiplier. 
The first order conditions are: 
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We can re-write these conditions as 
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Combining these two equations yields 
() [ ]() () ( ) () ( )
2 11 ( 1 ) 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 st st gu g u g αχ α χ α χ −+ + −+ − + − − += . (24) 
Solving for  st u , we obtain 
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Therefore,  () ()
/(1 ) /(1 ) ** /1 pt yA e
α α αα αβ
− − =−  and, from (8),  ( )
** * 1 ptp t ce y =− .
13 Note that 
y
* and c
* are strictly lower than they would be in the absence of the kleptocratic dictatorship 
(where e
* = 0). 
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. (27) 
                                                 
13 Because we assume that the depreciation rate of capital is zero, citizens do not need to save in the steady 
state in order to maintain a constant capital stock.    17
The solution to the dictator’s optimization problem is illustrated in Fig.1. His objective 
function D is maximized at the combination of ust and est where the iso-revenue curve 
intersects the NRC. 
 
4.2  Comparative Statics and Transitional Dynamics 
 
We now examine the impact of several key parameters on the steady state values of ypt, cpt, 
et and ust. These parameters capture the cost of revolt, g, the personality of the dictator, χ, 
and the attractiveness of alternative political regimes, ψ .
14 
 
4.2.1  Increase in the Cost of Revolt 
 
The cost of a revolt is measured by g. As discussed previously, g may be interpreted as the 
proportion of the economy’s productive capacity that is destroyed in an uprising that results 
in clashes between citizens and the dictator’s security force. 
  Fig. 2 shows that increasing the cost of revolt increases the dictator’s steady state 
expropriation rate, 
*
t e . On the other hand, the relationship between g and  st u  exhibits a mild 
inverted-U shape:  st u  at first increases and then declines as g continues to rise. For the 
chosen set of parameter values, in the region where g is small, an increase in g encourages 
the dictator to drastically increase the expropriation rate, even if it necessitates the hiring of 
a larger (and more costly) security force. As g becomes larger, the dictator increases the 
expropriation rate gradually while gradually shrinking the size of his security force. Both 
steady state output and consumption per civilian decline monotonically as g increases. 
 
4.2.2  Personality of the Dictator 
 
Recall our definition of χ as a parameter representing the immutable character and 
personality of the dictator. Our model specification results in χ having an identical effect to 
g since they appear symmetrically in the NRC.
15 The results shown in Fig. 2 therefore apply 
equally to χ as they do to g. That is, a more ruthless and cruel dictator lowers his citizens’ 
output and consumption levels. Note that these levels are strictly lower than what they 
                                                 
14 The baseline values of parameters used in the simulations that follow are:  1/3 α = ,  0.02 β = ,  0.3 p = , 
0.5 g = , and  0.05 ψ = . 
15 However, χ and g are distinct parameters. The former appears only in 
u
t U  while the latter appears in both 
u
t U  and 
s
t U .   18
would be without the dishonest and self-serving political regime. In the absence of the 
kleptocratic dictatorship, 
**
ptp t cy =  since 
* 0 e = . 
 
4.2.3  Attractiveness of Alternative Political Regimes 
 
The attractiveness of alternative political regimes is captured by the parameter ψ , which 
measures the proportion of output that is extracted by such a regime. The higher the value 
of ψ , the less pleasant is the alternative to the dictator. Fig. 3 shows that a lower value of 
ψ  (that is, a more attractive alternative regime) elicits more repressive behavior by the 
dictator, with higher equilibrium values of  t e  and  st u . The intuition behind this somewhat 
surprising result is that the existence of a more attractive political alternative to the current 
dictatorship increases the incentive for ordinary citizens to revolt. To prevent this, the 
dictator increases the size of his security force, which also enables him to extract a greater 
proportion of output. Steady state consumption and output per citizen are therefore 
increasing in ψ . We can show, however, that the dictator’s net revenue declines 
progressively as the alternative regime becomes more and more attractive. Although  t e  
increases as ψ  falls, its positive impact on net revenues is offset by the cost of maintaining 
the burgeoning security force. 
 
4.2.4  Transitional Dynamics 
 
In this model, an increase in χ or g generates the same transitional dynamics as a decline in 
ψ . Fig. 4 illustrates the two possible adjustment paths to the new steady state corresponding 
to different choices of parameter values. In the first, consumption per citizen cpt jumps 
upwards at the instant of the shock and then declines to the new (lower) long run level. In 
the second, cpt jumps down instantaneously and then declines to the same new long run 
level. In both cases, capital per citizen kpt, a non-jumping state variable, declines smoothly 
to the new, lower long run level.
16 
 
5.  Evaluating Alternative Aid Strategies 
 
We are now ready to use the model to explore the implications of alternative policy options 
open to developed countries wishing to assist citizens in countries under dictatorial rule. 
                                                 
16 In dynamic optimization problems such as that faced by the citizens in this model, control variables like cpt 
may jump while state variables like kpt cannot.    19
These options include: (i) unconditional foreign aid; (ii) conditional foreign aid with 
potential sanctions; (iii) financial assistance to the political opposition (if it exists) or 
military assistance to rebels; and (iv) funds for medical relief in the face of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. We assume that the dictator is able to expropriate a portion of foreign aid just as 
he does a part of domestic output. 
  As discussed in Section 2, while earlier studies concluded that aid does not 
significantly increase growth nor benefit the poor, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that aid 
targeted at countries with good existing policies have a positive impact on growth. This 
work and follow-up papers by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) have had a major impact 
upon policy; Easterly (2003) documents how it has influenced both individual governments 
and international organizations. As a result, policy conditionality, until recently seen as the 
main instrument for increasing the effectiveness of aid, has been dramatically displaced by 
the concept of selectivity. However, the correct basis for the selection of recipient countries 
has been keenly debated. The original Burnside and Dollar policy indicator has been 
discarded in favor of the more comprehensive World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index. In addition, Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard 
and Hansen (2001) argue that aid’s positive impact on growth is characterized by 
diminishing returns. In this section, we will use our model of kleptocracy and dictatorship to 
weigh in on the conditionality versus selectivity debate. 
 
5.1  Incorporating Foreign Aid in the Model 
 
Obstfeldt (1999) showed that aid has no effect on capital or output per worker in the 
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, regardless whether growth is exogenous or endogenous.
17 
Fortunately, our model proves much more useful for policy analysis in this regard. 
To model the impact of various forms of foreign aid, we need to modify the model 










,       ( 2 8 )  
where x is the income earned from engaging in productive activities and z is the foreign aid 
received by each citizen net of expropriation by the dictator. For simplicity (in order to 
obtain an analytical solution), we assume that individuals are risk averse in x and risk 
                                                 
17 Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) show that in an overlapping-generations (OLG) model, the impact of aid 
on long run productivity depends on the relative magnitudes of the return to capital investments and the 
discount rate of economic agents.   20
neutral in z. Risk neutrality in z implies that  0 ϑ = . This reduces the utility function to an 










.        ( 2 9 )  
Suppose the dictator’s expropriation rates for domestic output and foreign rate are identical. 
Then 
   (1 ) tt ze f =− ,          ( 3 0 )  
where f is the time-invariant amount of gross foreign aid per citizen. 
As before, the NRC implies that 
() 1
ns u
tt t t UU U λλ −− − = Φ . 
With the inclusion of foreign aid in the model, 
( ) ( ) 1, 1
n
tp t t UU e y e f ⎡⎤ =− − ⎣⎦ ,  
  ( ) ( ) 1, 1
ss
tt p t t UU g y g f ψψ ⎡⎤ =− − − − ⎣⎦ ,    (31) 
( ) ( ) 11
uu
tt t p t t t U U gep y gep f ⎡⎤ =− − − − − − ⎣⎦ . 
Substituting these expressions into the NRC yields 
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From the citizen’s optimization problem, we obtain 
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The NRC thus becomes 
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⎡ ⎤ −Φ ⎛⎞ + ⎛⎞ =− + − − + − ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
.    (35) 
The model is calibrated by choosing the following baseline parameter values:  1/3 α = , 
0.02 β = , 0.6 χ = , 0.5 g = , 0.05 ψ =  and  0 Φ = . 
 
5.2  Unconditional Foreign Aid 
 
5.2.1  Does unconditional or poorly conditioned foreign aid increase citizen welfare? 
 
Conditionality refers to the giving of aid on the basis of promises to adopt good policies in 
the future. In practice, conditionality has almost always failed so that the aid extended to 
many developing countries in the last forty years have been, for all intents and purposes, 
virtually unconditional.
 18 The blame is shared by recipient countries that fail to keep their 
promises and by aid agencies that do not strictly enforce the stated conditions nor mete out 
the necessary punishment when required. 
What is the relationship between the size of unconditional or poorly conditioned 
foreign aid, f, and key variables of interest such as et, ust, ypt and cpt? Fig. 5 shows that an 
increase in f in fact makes the dictator more repressive. By increasing the amount of money 
(from domestic output and foreign aid) that the dictator can potentially expropriate, the 
optimizing dictator responds to an increase in f by increasing the relative size of his security 
force  ust, which then allows him to increase his expropriation rate et. Output and 
consumption per citizen, ypt and cpt respectively, decline correspondingly. These results are 
therefore in accord with the lamentable track record of foreign aid to African states. Such 
aid, by enriching and strengthening the position of the kleptocratic dictator, stymies political 
and economic reform. Nor does it avert a social catastrophe or humanitarian crisis since it 
makes the citizens worse off.  
Fig. 6 indicates that the negative relationship between output per citizen and the size 
of foreign aid is less pronounced when the dictator is innately harsher, that is, when χ is 
larger. Nevertheless, output per citizen is lower for larger values of χ over a wide range of 
values for f. 
 
5.2.2  Dynamics of an increase in unconditional foreign  aid 
 
                                                 
18 For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find no relationship between official finance and policy reform.   22
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while the  0 pt k =   schedule is now described by 
   ( )( ) 11 pt t pt t ce A ke f
α =− +− .        ( 3 6 )  
The relationship between cpt and f is thus given by 







⎡⎤ = −+ + − ⎜⎟ ⎣⎦
⎝⎠
.      ( 3 7 )  
From our simulations, we know that  t e  increases when the amount of foreign aid f 
increases, that is  / 0 t de df > , and that  ( ) 1/ tp t t e Ak f de df
α −< + . Therefore  / 0 pt dc df <  
and the  0 pt c =   schedule shifts to the left while the  0 pt k =   schedule shifts down just as in 
Fig. 4. Again, consumption per citizen, cpt, may jump upwards or downwards at the moment 
f increases. In both cases, cpt declines thereafter to the new steady state level while capital 
per citizen, kpt, declines smoothly to its new long run level. 
 
5.3  Strict Conditional Aid with Sanctions 
 
5.3.1  Optimal conditionality 
Suppose the amount of foreign aid extended, ft, is now strictly conditional on the behavior 
of the dictator. Specifically, suppose it depends on his expropriation rate et according to 
     ( 1 ) tt f ef γ =− ,         ( 3 8 )  
where γ measures the sensitivity of aid to the dictator’s expropriation rate and f is the 
maximum amount of aid attainable. This parameter may also be interpreted as a proxy for 
the “tightness” or severity of sanctions against the dictator. Of course, in reality it may be 
difficult to perfectly observe the extent of the dictator’s thievery. Increasing international 
pressure on financial institutions to divulge information on the tainted assets of corrupt 
heads of states will greatly assist aid donors in making conditionality of this nature work.    
The dictator now maximizes     
() () ( )
**
0
11 tp t t s tt s t p t t De y f u L u y L d t α
∞
⎡ ⎤ =+ − − − ⎣ ⎦ ∫ ,      (39)   
subject to the NRC as well as equation (38).   23
With the dictator’s revenue decreasing in γ , tightening sanctions beyond a certain 
point may become counter-productive. Beyond this point, the dictator rejects foreign aid 
altogether, as the revenues obtained by expropriating both domestic output and foreign aid 
with the punitive constraint is lower than expropriating domestic output alone. 
Formally, the dictator maximizes  { } , tf t w f t DM a x D D = , subject to 
() ( ) ( ) /1 ts t eg p u g p ψ =+ + − −+ and  (1 ) tt f ef γ = − , where the dictator’s revenues with 
conditional foreign aid are  ( )() ( )
** 11 ft t pt t st t st pt t De y f u L u y L α ⎡ ⎤ =+ − − − ⎣ ⎦ while his 
revenues without aid are  ( ) ( )
** 11 wft t pt st t st pt t De yu L u y L α ⎡⎤ =− − − ⎣⎦ .  
Our simulations indicate that  t e  and  st u  decline till the break-even point where 
ftw f t D D =  (see Fig. 7). Moreover, ypt and cpt are maximised at this point. The optimal 
degree of tightness of sanctions associated with this point, γ
*, can be computed numerically. 
 
5.3.2  Interaction of Conditionality and Selectivity 
 
Advocates of selectivity argue that aid should be channeled only to countries whose policies 
(both macroeconomic and microeconomic) are in some sense already acceptable. Put 
simply, aid should be extended to countries on the basis of what they have done (which 
cannot be changed) rather than what they promise to do (which suffers from time 
inconsistency). Translating this debate on the appropriate form of aid-to-policy linkage to 
our model, we can think of χ (the parameter capturing the immutable characteristics of the 
dictator) as representing selectivity. Countries with larger values of χ are those with less 
desirable traits, as observed by the donor prior to the granting of aid. The parameter γ, as 
discussed previously, represents the extent of conditionality. 
  Fig. 8, which is essentially Fig. 7 plotted with different values of χ, shows that γ has 
a smaller impact on steady state consumption per citizen, cpt, when χ is larger. That is, the 
effect of conditionality on the well being of citizens in the recipient country depends on 
selectivity. In particular, the optimal value of γ is decreasing in χ: donor countries can 
impose tougher conditions (larger values of γ
*) when they are more selective (that is, 
extending aid only to dictators who are innately less offensive). The reason behind this 
result is that such dictators are less likely to reject the aid on the grounds that the attached 
conditions make them worse off than not receiving aid at all. Obviously, a given amount of 
aid results in higher consumption per citizen when χ is smaller. (The ridge line in Fig. 8 
shows the maximum value of cpt attainable for any given value of χ.)   24
  The results of this exercise suggest that conditionality and selectivity may be 
mutually enhancing rather than being mutually exclusive. Indeed, very recent papers such as 
Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004) make a case for a ‘new conditionality’ that 
combines both conditionality and selectivity. For example, there may be multiple levels of 
commitment and withdrawal, rather than a simple yes/no decision on whether to give aid or 
not. 
 
5.4  Political Assistance or Military Assistance to Rebels 
 
We model assistance to opposition political groups (if they exist) and military assistance to 
rebels by arguing that these types of assistance increase the probability that a citizen revolt 
succeeds, ceteris paribus. 
  The probability that a revolt succeeds is now given by 









,          ( 4 0 )  
where ξ > 1 measures the extent of political and military assistance. Note that when ξ = 1, 
the model reverts to the original. 
We assume that political and military assistance cannot be used for consumption or 
for building up capital. Note also that now  / ts t gu g ξ = . That is, the damage to production 
possibilities that results from clashes between the dictator’s security force and the citizenry 
during an uprising decreases with ξ as the public is better able to safeguard them with 
foreign assistance. Fig. 9 shows that steady state values of et and ust are decreasing in ξ, 
while the steady state values of cpt and ypt are increasing in ξ. 
 
5.5  Medical Relief for the HIV/AIDS Pandemic 
 
As is widely known, HIV/AIDs is wreaking a wide swath of destruction in Africa, ravaging 
the continent by prematurely taking away many members of the most productive part of the 
its labour force: prime-age males and females. It is estimated that 30 per cent of this group 
is infected with HIV even in South Africa and Botswana, two of the more successful 
economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Before killing its victims, HIV/AIDs weakens their 
bodies, destroys their health, and lowers their capacity for work.   25
  In this extension to our model, foreign medical assistance improves worker health 
and, consequently, raises labour productivity. However, we assume that once again the 
dictator expropriates a fraction et of this assistance.
19 
  The economy’s productivity level At is modelled as follows: 
   [ ] 01 2 (1 ) tt AA e f
φ
=+ ϒ − ϒ ,        ( 4 1 )  
where  12 , 0 ϒϒ >, and φ < 1 indicates that productivity is increasing in foreign aid, f, but at 
a decreasing rate. That is, the first few dollars of medical aid have the greatest impact on 
health (and therefore productivity) outcomes. A0 is the economy’s baseline productivity 
level in the absence of foreign aid. 
  Fig. 10 shows that, as foreign medical assistance is assumed to be dispensed without 
any conditions attached, indicators of the dictator’s degree of repression, et and ust, are 
increasing in f, just as in Section 5.1. However, the negative impact of rising repression on a 
citizen’s output and consumption levels is offset by the direct positive effect of foreign 
medical assistance on labour productivity and hence the wage rate. Because foreign aid 
exhibits diminishing returns with respect to its recipient’s health and productivity, there is a 
hump-shaped relationship between f and cpt. Our result therefore suggests that there is an 
optimal level of foreign medical assistance for recipient countries under dictatorial rule. 
 
6.  Impact of the Dictator’s Planning Horizon when the Economy’s 
Growth Rate is Endogenous 
 
While the title of our paper refers to Africa’s growth performance, our discussion of the 
model thus far has centred on output and consumption levels. Suppose we now the 
endogenize the economy’s growth rate by specifying the rate of technological progress to be 
a function of the dictator’s behavior, and more specifically, his expropriation rate: 






,        ( 4 2 )  
where  Z is a multiplicative constant and  0 ι >  is an elasticity parameter.
20 Such a 
specification may be justified on the grounds that, in the real world, the expropriation rate 
may determine the extent of foreign direct investment and hence the rate of technological 
transfer/diffusion from advanced countries. 
                                                 
19 Medical equipment and supplies (bandages, drugs etc) are highly susceptible to theft and extortion by a 
dictator’s henchmen. 
20 The following parameter values we used in our simulations: ι = 0.5 and Z = 0.03.   26
  Fig. 11 shows that when the rate of technological progress depends on the dictator’s 
expropriation rate, an increase in the dictator’s planning horizon decreases ust and et while 
increasing ypt and cpt.
21 Moreover, these effects are more pronounced when the dictator has 
a lower discount rate βD. That is, at any given planning horizon, a dictator with a higher 
discount rate will behave more repressively, expropriating a greater fraction of the 
economy’s output and employing a larger security force. These results indicate that a 
dictator who is more insecure about the longevity or permanence of his rule will behave 
worse from a social welfare perspective. This presents a dilemma for well-meaning foreign 
powers that wish to seek an overthrow of the dictatorial regime. Applying diplomatic or 
military pressure on the dictator (which led to unambiguously salutary outcomes in Section 
5.4) may now result in adverse outcomes for his citizens in terms of income and 
consumption until he is actually removed from power. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we presented a theoretical model of dictatorship and economic performance 
with the goal of explaining sub-Saharan Africa’s dismal post-colonial growth experience. 
We argued that Africa’s colonial legacy created the conditions for the abandonment of 
multi-party democracy in favour of one-party, and ultimately, authoritarian personal rule. In 
many countries, personal rule was synonymous with kleptocratic dictatorships, where 
political leaders were more interested in enriching themselves and in private gains than in 
promoting the welfare of their citizens. 
  Our dynamic continuous time model features a rational, optimizing dictatorship that 
seeks to maximize revenues generated through diversion of the economy’s output. The 
dictator employs a security force of sufficient size such that the probability of success of a 
potential citizens’ revolt is low enough to discourage them from attempting it. Taking the 
dictator’s optimal choices of his expropriation rate and size of his security force as given, 
citizens/civilians solve a Ramsey-type dynamic optimization problem to obtain their 
consumption and physical capital paths. An extension of the model endogenized the 
economy’s growth rate by making it a function of the dictator’s expropriation rate. Having 
obtained the steady state solutions of the model, we examined how the equilibrium values 
of variables such as consumption, output, the expropriation rate and size of the security 
                                                 
21 These plots are based on results from simulations programmed in GAUSS. The planning horizon refers to 
the number of periods in the objective function corresponding to a discrete-time version of (15). Details of all 
simulations and the corresponding program codes are available from the authors upon request.   27
force vary with the characteristics, preferences and planning horizon of the dictator. We 
found that the consumption of citizens and output are increasing in the expected longevity 
of the dictator’s rule and declining in the cost of revolts, the inherent ruthlessness of the 
dictator, and the attractiveness of alternative political regimes. In every instance, 
consumption and output are strictly lower than would be the case without a kleptocratic 
dictatorship. We also explored the dynamics governing the model away from the steady 
state. In addition, the model was calibrated to conduct and evaluate several policy 
experiments with important real-world implications. 
  Simulations of alternative intervention policies available to developed economies 
interested in the welfare of citizens living under dictatorial regimes suggest that 
unconditional or poorly conditioned foreign aid induces a dictator to become more 
repressive, raising his expropriation rate and the size of his security force. On the other 
hand, conditioning the magnitude of foreign aid on the dictator’s observed behavior raises 
citizens’ consumption and output, provided that the conditions are not so harsh that the 
dictator rejects the aid altogether. Moreover, conditionality and selectivity in aid policy may 
be mutually enhancing. Political assistance and military assistance to covert rebel groups 
are also shown to be beneficial to macroeconomic performance. Finally, we find that there 
exists an optimal level of medical aid for relieving the HIV/AIDS crisis ravaging the 
African continent. When the amount of medical aid is small, increasing it greatly improves 
the health and productivity outcomes of citizens. However, beyond a certain level, the 
marginal improvements in these outcomes are offset and dominated by the worsening of the 
dictator’s repressive behavior arising from his ability to expropriate part of the funds or 
equipment intended for medical relief.   28
Appendix A: Solving the Citizen’s Optimization Problem 
 
The Hamiltonian for the optimal control problem is given by 
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while the transversality condition is: 
   lim 0 tp t t k γ
→∞ = . 
The Euler equation describing the optimal consumption path is obtained by combining the 
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while the  0 pt k =   schedule is 
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Appendix B: Dynamics of the Model 
 
The laws of motion for consumption and capital derived from the civilian optimization 
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, Eigen values have opposite signs, 
implying that the solution is a saddle path. 
Let Γ be the root of the characteristic equation representing the Eigen values of the 
system. The characteristic equation for the system may be written as      
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That is, 
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Equation of the Stable Arm:   30
 
A standard means of calculating the slope of the stable arm is to let  2 0 A = . Note that  2 A  is 
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Combining the above expressions yields 
() ()
**
1 pt pt pt pt cc kk β =+− Γ − ,        ( B 1 0 )  
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This final expression is the equation of the stable arm. The slope of the stable arm around 
the steady state is 
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= Γ> for 0 1 t e ≤ <  ensures that the 
qualitative results of the model will be unaffected by changes in  t e  as the slope of the stable 
arm does not alter sign. The quantitative outcome may however be affected, although that is 
not our focus here.   31
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Fig. 3 Impact of ψ on ust, et, ypt and cpt  
 



































Response of ust and et to changes








0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
chi or g
et ust
Response of ypt and cpt to changes









0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
chi or g











































Time paths of cpt and kpt 
 
Fig. 4 Transitional dynamics of a rise in χ and g or a fall in ψ 
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Fig. 6 Outcome of unconditional foreign aid and the dictator’s characteristics 
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Fig. 7 Impact of conditional foreign aid on ust, et, ypt and cpt 
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Fig. 10 Impact of foreign medical relief on ust, et, ypt and cpt 
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Fig. 11 Impact of the dictator’s planning horizon and discount rate on ust, et, ypt and cpt 
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